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RYAN M. IRWIN
Apartheid on Trial: South West Africa and the
International Court of Justice, 1960-1966

Harold Taswell was not a happy man in the summer of 1965.
As South Africa’s ambassador to the United States, he held
one of the most important and prestigious positions in the
Republic’s Office of Foreign Affairs.
were not going well.

However, things

In August, he presented a less-than-

subtle report to his superiors in Pretoria: ‘Could Paul
Kruger have avoided war with England and yet retained the
integrity of the Republic?

Will we be able to avoid an

armed clash with the United States—or an armed clash with
the United Nations strongly backed by the United States—and
still retain our integrity?

There is a parallel between

the period preceding the Anglo-Boer War and conditions
prevailing today.

The situation is equally dangerous.’

He went on to outline the nature of the threats facing
South Africa.

‘[P]owerful forces’ in Washington were out

to ‘goad and provoke [South Africa] into taking some action
which would give America a face saving excuse for applying
sanctions against us, for breaking off diplomatic relations
and finally for armed intervention.’

Framing President

Lyndon Johnson as a ‘calculating yet quick tempered,
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impetuous man,’ Taswell further lamented that the American
President was so committed to racial integration that he
was ‘push[ing] aside all those who stand in his way . . .
[even] his own Whites.’

In the ambassador’s words, ‘Our

policy and his are diametrically opposed.’

And the path

forward was becoming treacherous: ‘The tougher nut we are
to crack, the less likely are we to be attacked but we must
not underestimate the American danger and the tremendous
military power of this country.

As Oscar Wilde remarked it

is easy to choose one’s friends but one must be very
careful in choosing one’s enemies.’1
Clearly, all was not quiet on the Republic’s Western
front.

Taswell’s anxiety was palpable, and tied to a

simple, unavoidable fact—the first phase of the global
struggle against apartheid was coming rapidly to its
climax.

Inspired by the political openings of second-wave

decolonisation, African nationalists had rallied against
South Africa in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre in
1960, creating a coherent political bloc at the United
Nations that was dedicated to eliminating white racism on
the African continent.

These efforts deepened and

accelerated trends that began with first-wave
decolonization in the late 1940s.

By 1965, Third World

nationalists had not only driven a wedge between South
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Africa and its traditional Western allies; they had
transformed the dynamics of the Cold War.

As one

journalist observed that year, the apartheid question had
become ‘symbolic of bigger issues,’ namely whether ‘the
demands of Bandung’ would influence the nature of global
power in the postcolonial era.2

Taswell’s apprehensive

telegram reflected the fears and suspicions of many white
South Africans as they surveyed these developments in the
mid-1960s.

The citadel of white redoubt—constructed so

methodically by South African leaders in the years after
World War II—was now in the midst of a full-scale
diplomatic siege.

And former allies like the United States

could no longer be counted on for moral, economic, or
political support.
Historians have approached this complex moment from
several vantage points.

The majority of scholarship on

South Africa was written between the 1970s and the early
1990s, at the height of anti-apartheid activism in the
United States and Great Britain.

Inspired often by debates

on disinvestment, this literature was primarily activist in
its orientation and focused primarily on the economic
connections between corporations in the United States,
Great Britain, and South Africa.

Many authors borrowed

arguments from contemporary protest movements, and blamed
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the West for insulating the apartheid regime through its
tacit acceptance of investment in South Africa.3

When

applied to the world facing Taswell in 1965, the
limitations of this literature are fairly self-evident.
Most of these authors are uninterested in developments
within the National Party and dismissive of tensions
between South Africa and its Western allies.

Adhering

almost exclusively to the assumptions of the neo-colonial
critique, these scholars paint pan-European power in
monolithic, racist terms and flatten the complexities and
contradictions of those who rejected white rule in South
Africa.
Since the fall of the National Party, scholarship on
apartheid in the 1960s has grown more diverse.

Among U.S.

historians, the most notable contributions look at the
links between the domestic civil rights movement and U.S.
government policy toward South Africa.

Recent monographs

by Thomas Borstelmann, Robert Massie, and Mary Dudziak,
among many others, illustrate how decolonisation
transformed the boundaries of America’s own racial
revolution.

Influenced primarily by methodologies of

social and political history, these contributions often
frame U.S.-South African relations along an imaginary color
line that ran from Jim Crow America through the southern
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part of the African continent.4

Looking through the lens of

a much different archival record, historians from South
Africa offer an alternative vision of the period.

For

many, the most important aspect of the apartheid years was
local activism by indigenous Africans.

Drawing frequently

upon narrative themes of resistance, these scholars add
depth and texture to the historical record, and provide the
‘New’ South Africa with a usable past to deal with the
contemporary challenges of racial reconciliation.

Rather

than highlighting the role of civil rights groups abroad,
they focus often on exile organisations like the African
National Congress, as well as subaltern peasants and
workers in South Africa.5
My article aims to do something different.

It blends

multi-archival research with cultural analysis, treating
the decade after second wave or African decolonisation as a
global conjuncture when multiple actors competed to shape
the terms of legitimacy at the international level.6

Using

the apartheid question as a window on this process, I look
specifically at how several influential global actors—the
so-called African bloc, the National Party, and the U.S.
government—tried to police knowledge about South Africa in
these years.

During this moment, South Africa’s system of

institutionalised racial domination came to function as a

-5-

geopolitical site of contestation, rallying international
opinions in concrete ways and infusing particular meanings
into words like security, justice, development, and
freedom.7

By highlighting the possibilities and limitations

of change in the years after decolonisation, the debate
over apartheid offers a unique microcosm of the
postcolonial moment in the 1960s.
This article looks at an important turning point in
this story.

Although downplayed or forgotten by many

historians, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case
against South Africa was a transformative event.

My

analysis examines not only the evolution of the case
between 1960 and 1966, but also the role it played in the
larger political chess match between the National Party and
the African bloc during this period.8

South African

officials genuinely feared that a negative ruling would
lead to sanctions or some type of armed conflict before
1967; African leaders fully expected that a positive ruling
would reorient the terms of global legitimacy in their
favor and validate the demands of the global south.

The

actual verdict delivered by the Court in late July 1966
surprised both sides and sent shockwaves through the
international system, redefining the movement against white
power in southern Africa.

Viewed by many as the most
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important decision in the Court’s history, the trial offers
a unique window on how actors in the First and Third Worlds
conceptualised—and contested—the notion of political order
in the decade after decolonisation.
In exploring this story, this article is bound by two
interlocking arguments.
Africa was political.

First, the ICJ case against South
The primary aim of the African bloc

in the early 1960s was to implement sanctions against the
National Party and lay the foundation for an armed
intervention of South West Africa.

By the mid-1960s it was

abundantly obvious that the Security Council—specifically
the United States and Great Britain—would not accept
General Assembly resolutions as evidence that South
Africa’s Mandate over South West Africa was a breach of
international peace and security.

If the African bloc

could secure a positive ruling at the International Court,
it would break the deadlock over these issues and force the
great powers into action.

In contradistinction, South

African officials hoped a victory at the Court would
fragment the international anti-apartheid struggle and
eliminate the possibility of sanctions by the United
Nations.

In both scenarios, the case formed the pivot of a

uniquely political game.
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At the same time, the ICJ case was about legitimacy.
Both sides were drawn to the Court because it represented a
source of unbiased authority in the international system.
Positioned as the linchpin of America’s multilateral
postwar political order, the Court systemized and reified
values for the global community.9

For the African bloc, the

goal was not only to defeat South Africa, but to do so on
uniquely postcolonial terms.

By formally delegitimising

the apartheid system, Africans felt they would translate
the implications of universal human rights into
international law and verify the moral power of the
nonwhite liberation struggle.
for the National Party.

The stakes were equally high

A victory would not simply

insulate the government from sanctions and armed
intervention; it would effectively buttress South Africa’s
assertion that sovereignty trumped universal equality in
the postcolonial era.

If anti-apartheid activism could be

framed as a mere side show in the larger drama between
liberal capitalism and communism, South Africa would be
free to reposition itself as the West’s principal ally on
the African continent.
When viewed within these frameworks, the ICJ case
emerges as a watershed moment.

The Court’s verdict was

delivered during a period of remarkable turmoil in the

-8-

international system.

Third World nationalists who had

rallied to the United Nations in the years after
decolonisation were beginning to lose their faith in the
organisation by the mid-1960s.

The outcome of the ICJ case

reflected and reinforced these trends.

It became a

powerful symbol, dramatising the limitations of change in
the postcolonial era and foreshadowing future directions in
the struggle against apartheid in southern Africa.

APARTHEID’S ACHILLES HEEL
Kenneth Kaunda was an emerging African leader in 1964.
As the Prime Minister of the most recently liberated nation
in Africa, he was invited to the semi-annual Conference of
Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo, Egypt, that autumn to speak
on behalf of the Zambian people.

His speech to the

conference centered on one basic theme—now was not the time
for new looks on Third World issues.10

His speech opened

with a few words on the continued moral clarity of nonalignment, then shifted into an extended diatribe on white
power in southern Africa.

Noting that the ‘forces of

reaction’ still loomed large over Africa, Kaunda pointed
specifically to the Republic of South Africa, arguing that
apartheid would ‘reap the whirlwind of disaster’ if it
continued to violate ‘reason and the fundamental principles
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of civilisation and humans rights.’

His solution was

deceptively straight-forward—a renewed commitment to the
‘diplomacy of peace.’

White redoubt could only be defeated

through international action.

‘We all know that the United

Nations Organization is the only key to international and
national security,’ he explained.

‘[I]t is through the

strength of the General Assembly that the non-aligned
nations will be secure until all the powerful nations are
politically, economically and socially just.’11
The speech was an important moment in Kaunda’s
embryonic political career.

Wrapped in the language and

logic of Third World nationalism, it helped position him to
succeed Gamal Abdel Nasser as the Secretary General of the
Non-Aligned Movement.

It also revealed many of the

assumptions that animated nationalist thought among Third
World elites in the mid-1960s.

For leaders like Kaunda,

apartheid was an affront to the very concept of nonwhite
political liberation.

Since the onset of first-wave

decolonization in the 1940s, South Africa’s racial policies
had served as an imaginative foil for much of the
decolonized world, providing an array of politicians with a
common enemy at the international level.12

Kaunda’s

comments showcased how many of these actors conceptualised
action against the monolith of white redoubt.

- 10 -

The best

strategy was not guerilla warfare or aid from communist
powers but diplomacy at the United Nations.

For Kaunda,

the numerical superiority of African and Asian countries at
the General Assembly was significant.

Non-aligned nations

did not just have a seat at the table; they had the right
to control the conversation on North-South issues.

They

had the right to use the U.N. to confront white racism in
Africa.
Kaunda’s speech offers an ideal vantage point on the
international anti-apartheid movement in the years
surrounding decolonisation.

This was a struggle defined

not by Western liberals, church leaders, or even civil
rights groups in the United States, but by nationalists
from the Third World.

As Frederick Cooper and others

illustrate, these nationalists adhered to a metanarrative
that blended modernisation with non-racialism and equated
national liberation with socio-economic progress.13

By the

mid-1960s, their fight against apartheid had reached a
paradoxical crossroads.

On the one hand, postcolonial

nationalists had successfully forced the United Nations
Security Council to pass an arms embargo against the
Nationalist government and connected the question of
apartheid to the broader constellation of colonial issues
in Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique.
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However, the

major prizes—economic sanctions and military intervention—
were still out of reach.

Although the African bloc and its

allies could pass General Assembly resolutions against
South Africa with ease and frequency, they found it nearly
impossible to move the Security Council beyond a position
of symbolic criticism vis-à-vis apartheid.
Members of the African bloc understood these
difficulties well.

In the early 1960s many had hoped the

General Assembly would push the Security Council past this
tipping point through article 14 of the United Nations
Charter, which gave the Assembly the ability to ‘recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation . . .
it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly
relations between nations.’

African nationalists had

initially believed that if they demonstrated that South
Africa was a danger to ‘the maintenance of international
peace and security,’ the Security Council would be obliged
to take action under the provisions of chapter VII, which
outlined the Council’s role in dealing with member-state
aggression.14
happen.

By 1964 it was clear that this would not

The United States and Great Britain—with their

sizeable economic investments in the Republic and positions
of influence on the Security Council—were simply unwilling
to accept U.N. General Assembly resolutions or Special
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Committee reports as proof that South Africa was a direct
threat to international peace.
Faced with this impasse, African nationalists shifted
their strategy.

If progress in the political realm had

reached its natural boundaries, the alternative was action
through the system of international law.

Stated plainly,

the answer was the International Court of Justice.
approach was not entirely unfounded.

This

U.S. planners,

inspired by the achievements of the New Deal, had used the
ideology of liberalism to rationalise America’s
‘preponderance of power’ in the late 1940s.

The

international system they created was based not on power
politics and intimidation, but legal structure and
multilateralism.15

This framework opened a range of

pathways for Third World activists in the decade after
decolonisation and, so long as the great powers were
committed to this liberal international order, a victory
against South Africa at the International Court would have
serious repercussions.

Article 94 of the U.N. Charter

explicitly bound the Security Council to uphold Court
judgments.

In the minds of many African strategists, a

legal victory against apartheid at the Court would put the
United States and Great Britain in a political checkmate,
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forcing both countries to choose between concrete action
against South Africa and a veto in support of Pretoria.
The Republic’s controversial Mandate over South West
Africa offered an ideal basis for litigation.

The League

of Nations had entrusted South Africa with a Class ‘C’
Mandate over Germany’s colony following World War I.

In

theory, this Mandate was to become a United Nations Trust
Territory after World War II, but South African leaders
made an aggressive power play in the late 1940s, arguing
that because the United Nations was not the natural
successor to the League of Nations the territory no longer
belonged to the international community.

In their minds,

there was no transfer of power between the League and the
U.N.

As such, South West Africa was now sovereign to South

Africa.

The United Nations responded to this challenge

methodically, soliciting the views of the International
Court of Justice in a series of advisory opinions in the
early 1950s that denounced Pretoria’s actions as insolent
and unlawful.

However, the Court’s advisory rulings were

nonbinding and South Africa’s intransigence went largely
uncontested through the 1950s.16

All the African bloc had

to do was prove in a contentious hearing that South
Africa’s Mandate was illegitimate.
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The legal basis for

action against apartheid would immediately be established
at the United Nations.
A victory on this front would be a major
accomplishment.

With the Rivonia Trials of early 1964 the

National Party had effectively put to rest the notion that
it would succumb naturally to internal pressures from the
African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress
(PAC).

South Africa, in the words of one journalist, was

not going to be the ‘next Algeria.’17
were dejected by this turn of events.

Most observers abroad
‘South Africa’s

monolithic police state with all its ramifications of spies
and informers makes it impossible for organized violence or
boycotts to be planned,’ lamented one activist at an
international conference on apartheid in 1965.18

The South

West Africa Mandate, however, was the chink in the
seemingly impenetrable armor of white power.

In the mind

of many African leaders, the region represented ‘the
Achilles heel of apartheid.’

While the National Party

could use notions of sovereignty to shield its internal
policies from international criticism, its position in the
Mandate territory was tenuous at best.

In the words of one

African nationalist, South West Africa was not only a
‘major issue in world politics,’ but also a ‘flashpoint in
the international struggle against apartheid—involving not
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only African nations but the great powers as well.’19
Victory would be more than symbolic.

It would create the

legal rationale for a roll-back process that stopped only
at Table Mountain in Cape Town.
The African bloc announced it would bring litigation
against the Republic in late 1960.

Although most African

countries provided resources to pay for trial expenses,
Ethiopia and Liberia coordinated the effort because they
had been members of the League of Nations when the Mandate
was originally conferred on South Africa.
of the case was a large one.

The first hurdle

The African bloc needed to

confirm that it had a legal basis to challenge the
Republic’s policies in South West Africa.

To develop their

strategy, the Applicants hired a New York-based lawyer with
extensive experience in the U.S. State Department—Ernest A.
Gross.

Gross had written extensively on the role of the

United Nations in promoting international peace and
justice, and African leaders viewed him as an ideal ally.
According to Enuga Reddy, a U.N. official who worked
closely with African leaders in the 1960s, Gross was
‘chosen as the counsel in the hope that he would influence
the U.S. Government.’20

The African Group’s aim was not

just to win the case but to push the United States and
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Great Britain into the worldwide coalition against
apartheid.
Gross approached the job from an equally distinct
vantage point.

The fifty-four year old liberal lawyer

viewed the trial as a chance to rectify the growing tension
between the politics of postcolonialism at the General
Assembly and the politics of the Cold War at the Security
Council.

In the vernacular of modern legal theory, he was

an advocate of ‘transitional justice.’

As historian

Elizabeth Borgwardt explains, this paradigm embraced ‘an
alternative way of thinking about the relation of law to
political transformation,’ treating justice as ‘distinctive
in times of transition—partial, contingent, and shaped by
social understandings of prior injustice rather than by
abstract, idealized conceptions of the rule of law.’21

In

Gross’s mind, decolonisation represented the major
transformation of the late twentieth century.

‘New nations

explode into being, not like stars in space, but as
neighbors on a crowded planet,’ he wrote in 1962.

‘New

opportunities bring need for corresponding changes in
process and structure.’

If the history of man was a story

of ‘endless struggle toward durable peace and a just
order,’ South Africa was important for one reason—new
nations emerging on to the world stage viewed apartheid as
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an impediment to further human progress.

As such, it

needed to be confronted.22
Gross explained his mindset on South Africa well
during an informal lunch with American officials before he
accepted the African bloc’s job offer in 1960.

According

to notes of the meeting:
Gross said the importance of SWA has often been
overlooked because of the broader problem of
apartheid in the Union.

In his view the problem

of South West arose because of apartheid and was
inextricably tied up with it. . . . [By] using
South West Africa to bring additional pressure
against the Union, [the Mandate] might be a
handle to get at the apartheid question itself.
He said this gave added emphasis to the question
of timing and tactics since at some point the
question of South West Africa and apartheid would
. . . merge into one effort.23
This mindset shaped Gross’s strategic approach during the
initial phase of the case in 1961 and 1962.

As counsel to

the African bloc, he articulated a two-pronged legal
assault that cast the situation in wide terms.

The first

step was proving that the South West Africa Mandate still
existed.

Drawing heavily upon the Court’s own advisory
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opinions, Gross’s initial Memorial asserted that the
General Assembly had replaced the League Council as the
primary oversight organisation of the Mandate System.24
Despite South Africa’s assertions to the contrary, the
Republic had tacitly accepted the authority of the United
Nations in 1946 by requesting feedback on whether South
West Africa could be annexed by Pretoria.

It was only

after this request was denied that Nationalist leaders fell
back to the thesis of discontinuity.

According to Gross,

these points meant the Mandate was still an ‘autonomous
territory’ with ‘international character.’25

As such, the

South African government was obliged to provide regular
reports and petitions to the United Nations and submit to
the general will of the world community.26
was the linchpin of Gross’s case.

This argument

If the Court rejected

the claim that South West Africa was within the basic
jurisdiction of the United Nations, the Applicant’s case
would collapse before it even began.
The second part of the African bloc’s legal assault
focused on the terms of the Mandate.

Gross went through

the original document with methodical care, emphasising how
the South African government had debased its territorial
responsibilities and violated the human rights of
indigenous peoples.

Despite the fact that article 4 of the
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Mandate explicitly prohibited the creation of army or navy
bases in the territory, the Republic had done exactly the
opposite.

‘Armoured corps are not normally used for police

protection or internal security,’ Gross noted with a hint
of sarcasm in 1961.27

South Africa was deliberately turning

the territory into a buffer zone for white power, stifling
local independence movements while ignoring the development
needs of the people.28
Human rights questions were featured prominently in
the Memorial.

Hearkening back to article 2 of the Mandate—

which instructed South Africa to ‘promote to the utmost the
material and moral well-being and social progress of the
inhabitants of the territory’—Gross’s legal team provided
nearly one-hundred pages of self-proclaimed factual
evidence on the ‘well-being, social progress, and
development of people in the territory.’29

Their analysis

constituted a veritable tour d'horizon of Western
development theory in the early 1960s, and focused on how
South Africa had retarded the economic growth,
representative government, citizenship rights, freedom of
movement, personal security, rights of residence, and
educational opportunities of people living in South West
Africa.

The result was a damning portrait of neglect.30
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The logic undergirding Gross’s legal brief was fairly
self-evident.

If the Mandate System was built on a ‘sacred

trust’ between the Mandatory and indigenous people, South
Africa’s policies of apartheid breached this agreement.
such, the Mandate needed to be revoked.

As

The New York

lawyer was modeling Africa’s case on the most prominent
human rights trial of the twentieth century—the Nuremberg
Trials.

Like the litigation against Nazi Party leaders in

the 1940s, his argument centered on the idea that inhumane
acts committed against civilian populations were indictable
as ‘crimes against humanity.’

Gross also understood that—

like the Nuremberg Trials—the South West Africa case would
function as a contest over the meaning of human rights and
justice in the decolonized world.

It was essential,

therefore, that his attacks link the Republic’s failures in
the realm of development with its support of inequality and
racial separation.31

Progress was simply incompatible with

apartheid in the postcolonial era.

In his words:

[T]he Mandatory has not only failed to promote
‘to the utmost’ the material and moral wellbeing, the social progress and the development of
the people of South West Africa, but it has
failed to promote such well-being and social
progress in any significant degree whatever.
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To

the contrary, the Mandatory has thwarted the
well-being, the social progress and the
development of the people of South West Africa
throughout varied aspects of their lives. . . .
The grim past and present reality in the
condition of the ‘Natives’ is unrelieved by
promise of future amelioration.

The Mandatory

offers no horizon of hope to the ‘Native’
population.32
This vision of social justice was tied closely to the
symbolic matrix of Third World nationalism.
governance ispo facto was an inhuman act.

Non-indigenous
Therefore, it

followed that political independence—defined literally as
control of fixed territorial space—formed the gateway to
economic and social development.

A victory on these terms

would not only provide the legal basis for concrete action
against the Republic of South Africa.

It would

institutionalise the connection between apartheid and moral
iniquity and establish a fulcrum to reframe global norms
around postcolonial objectives.
These stakes were not lost on the Nationalist
government.

Afrikaner elites combated the global anti-

apartheid movement through a multi-faceted program of
propaganda, political resistance, and grassroots lobbying

- 22 -

during the early 1960s.

Their goal was not to engage

African nationalists directly in a debate on human rights,
but to work outside the parameters of the United Nations to
subtly reframe the nature of the conversation on
apartheid.33

The National Party’s initial response to the

Applicant charges at the International Court fit into this
initiative.

The government put its faith in David P. de

Villiers, a prominent member of the South African Bar with
close ties to Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd.

Not

surprisingly, his philosophical attitudes on international
law contrasted starkly with Gross’s ‘transitional justice.’
An ardent political and social conservative, de Villiers
supported a static vision of global order based on national
sovereignty and historical tradition.
In forming South Africa’s response to the Memorial, de
Villiers’s legal team tried to do an end-run on human
rights questions by focusing exclusively on the status of
the South West Africa Mandate.
four parts.

Their argument unfolded in

Wrapped around a sophisticated interpretation

of Western contractual law, the first point claimed that
the Mandate could not be viewed as a binding legal
agreement because the resolution that created it was termed
a ‘declaration’ rather than ‘treaty or convention.’34

When

South Africa refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the
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United Nations in 1945, it followed that the Mandate ceased
to exist.35

The second and third points attacked the locus

standi of Ethiopia and Liberia.

Pushing the boundaries of

circular logic, South Africa asserted that because no
country still belonged to the League of Nations, it was
technically impossible to challenge South Africa’s control
over South West Africa.

Drawing again on the specific

language of the Charter, South African lawyers rationalized
this claim by pointing out that article 7—which outlined
proper recourse in the case of a dispute over South West
Africa—did not say that ‘former’ League members could
challenge the Mandate.

The third point made this argument

in a slightly different way, speculating that the
Applicants could not technically have a dispute with South
Africa anyway because Mandatory powers were answerable only
to the League as an entity.
standing.36

Individual states had no

Finally, de Villiers’s team sought to delay the

litigation, claiming that ‘direct diplomatic intercourse’
between the Applicants and South Africa had yet to take
place.

Previous discussions at the United Nations were

meaningless because they had been conducted in a ‘charged
political environment.’

Until the Republic was given ‘a

real and genuine opportunity to negotiate it can not be
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said that the dispute is one which cannot be settled by
negotiation.’37
South Africa’s efforts were almost successful.

In a

narrow eight-to-seven decision just before Christmas 1962,
the Court accepted the first part of Gross’s argument.

The

Mandate existed despite the dissolution of the League, and
Ethiopia and Liberia had the right to challenge South
Africa’s policies in South West Africa.

As one legal

scholar explained at the time, the decision symbolically
indicated that the ‘sacred trust’ would not be ‘allowed to
go by default and just disappear into thin air.’38

The

Nationalist government was accountable for its actions in
South West Africa.

In an opinion that foreshadowed the

next stage of the legal battle, one prominent judge
explained that the law was a ‘living phenomenon which
translates the collective exigencies and necessities of
each historical moment.’

Noting that the ‘social

occurrences’ of each era were the most important sources of
global order, he explained, ‘Law is not just a mental
abstraction, nor the result of repeated application of
written jurisprudence, but, rather, a norm of conduct which
is rooted in social intercourse.’39

The implications were

obvious—momentum was on the side of Gross’s ‘transitional
justice.’
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FROM NUREMBURG TO BROWN
For the Nationalist government, the Court’s decision
constituted just one part of the much larger—and
universally unfavorable—political landscape of the early
1960s.

As one South African journalist lamented, the

Republic’s ‘spiritual place in the world [was]
disappearing.’40

Indeed, attacks on South Africa were

coming from several directions.

On the one hand, the

country’s position in the Western bloc was under fire.

The

Republic was effectively removed from the British
Commonwealth in 1961 when it refused to implement nonracial domestic reforms demanded by Ghana, Nigeria, and
India, and it was subjected to an arms embargo by the U.N.
Security Council in mid-1963 when the Kennedy
administration bowed to the pressure of the so-called AfroAsian bloc.

At the same time, South Africa’s position in

southern Africa was unstable.

As historian Susan Onslow

demonstrates, the Republic’s relationship with Rhodesia was
wrought with tension as Ian Smith prepared the country for
its Unilateral Declaration of Independence.41
By the mid-1960s, South Africa stood at a difficult
crossroads.

In the words of Prime Minister Verwoerd, the

‘crux of the problem’ was whether being in the ‘good books
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of world opinion’ mattered as much as ‘ensur[ing] the
survival of the white race in this country.’42

The answer

was obvious to most high-ranking government officials—even
if the consequences were not.

Despite a constant stream of

propaganda on South Africa’s economic and political
invulnerability, many officials understood that the
country’s long-term prospects were entwined intimately with
the world situation.

According to Foreign Minister Eric H.

Louw, South Africa could weather criticism from the United
Nations General Assembly, but the ‘attitude of those
countries outside the Bandung-Communist combination,’
namely the United States and Great Britain, posed a
‘serious threat’ to South Africa’s continued prosperity.43
And as one top-secret review admitted, the ‘good-will, aid
and investment’ of the West was simply ‘more important to
South Africa than vice versa.’44

With the United States

embroiled in its own civil rights revolution and the
apartheid debate sitting at the nexus of postcolonial
politics at the United Nations, this uneven relationship
meant trouble for the Republic.45
It was in this environment that the second phase of
the ICJ case took on tremendous significance.

Viewed

widely as an unbiased institution of law, the Court
provided a forum where values were contested and normalized
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for the international community.

If the logic undergirding

Gross’s second argument was accepted by the Court, it was
entirely possible that attitudes toward South Africa’s
situation would harden into outright hostility.

As de

Villiers explained to his superiors after South Africa’s
legal defeat in 1962, the ICJ case was one of the ‘greatest
threats facing the Republic.’46

A victory, on the other

hand, would carry substantial dividends.

If the

Nationalist government could show that apartheid in South
West Africa was not a violation of human rights—if it could
decouple concepts of justice from the nonwhite liberation
narrative—the government would gain a leverage point to
reverse trends toward confrontation with the West.

In the

minds of South African officials, the ICJ case was the
tipping point in the larger contest over the Republic’s
future in the Western bloc.
South Africa’s legal strategy during the second phase
of the trial was elaborate.

Not surprisingly, de Villiers

opened his case by rearguing his original claims on the
nature of the Mandate and U.N. succession.

He sharpened

the thesis of discontinuity by positing that the Mandate
was accountable not to a nebulous ‘international community’
but to a concrete institution—in this case the League of
Nations.

Consequently, it was not possible for a wholly
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different institution to have supervisory powers without
the Republic’s consent.

The African bloc’s evidence that

South Africa had given this consent tacitly in 1946 was
countered with a series of previously undisclosed ‘new
facts’ that delved deep into the minutiae of the historical
record, drawing on a constellation of minor points to muddy
the clarity of Gross’s original argument.47

Recognising

that the Court had already ruled on this issue in 1962, de
Villiers tried reframing the Court’s decision as a narrow
verdict on jurisdiction rather than an expansive judgment
on the discontinuity thesis.

This assertion was not

entirely true, but with the Court divided eight-to-seven a
South African breakthrough was not impossible.

If one

judge accepted the validity of the Republic’s ‘new facts,’
the original basis of the case would have to be
reconsidered.

And without evidence of consent, Gross could

be pushed into a corner where he would have to argue that
the ‘international community’ had boundless supervisory
powers over nation-states in the world-system.
The meat of South Africa’s case was its rebuttal of
the African bloc’s characterization of apartheid in South
West Africa.

For de Villiers, everything pivoted on

showing that segregation could not be conflated with
oppression.

In a brief that totaled over 1,400 pages, his
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legal team challenged both the factual and conceptual
accuracy of Gross’s initial Memorial, explaining that
apartheid did not retard social progress but offered each
racial group the tools for ‘separate development.’

Far

from functioning as an agent of race hatred, this program
allowed South West Africa’s ‘major ethnic groups to achieve
an increasing measure of self-government and to develop
toward self-determination in a political and territorial
entity of its own.’48
approach was twofold.

The Republic’s rationalisation of its
In defensive terms, South African

lawyers claimed it was unfair for the white community to
sacrifice its ‘institutions, its culture [and] its
heritage’ in the face of a ‘numerically preponderant and
aggressively nationalistic Bantu population.’49

Drawing on

popular binaries between civility and barbarism, they
suggested that South Africa’s demographic and historic
particularities made multi-racialism a dangerous myth.
At the same time, de Villiers and his associates cast
separate development as a positive alternative to the
‘cultural imperialism’ of ‘European universalism.’
Rejecting the language of early twentieth-century racial
thought, South Africa used social science to show that
ethnic groups were ‘different’ in objective ways and
deserved the chance to develop in line with their own
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standards.

Quoting Prime Minister Verwoerd, de Villiers

asserted that this program was not a byproduct of white
supremacy, but a practical way to allow groups to live
‘next to one another as good neighbors and not as people
who are continually quarrelling over [power].’50
was not racism but conservative Christianity.

The issue

Apartheid,

in this depiction, was South Africa’s practical response to
the Biblical lessons of Babel.51
On the strength of this framework, de Villiers
proceeded to reject each accusation of the Applicant’s
Memorial.

In the economic realm, he asserted that whites

were more powerful than indigenous people in South West
Africa because Natives were uninterested in private
property and modern capitalism.

Drawing on ethnographical

evidence and expert testimonies, South African lawyers
suggested that most Africans chose to remain independent of
the ‘money economy’ because they preferred subsistence
farming and local trade networks.

Those individuals who

bucked these trends generally gravitated to regional mining
industries, where they avoided trade unions because of
their illiteracy and linguistic diversity.

Framing

government policy in munificent terms, de Villiers
suggested that Nationalist officials only represented
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Natives on labor boards so that their welfare was protected
from ‘unscrupulous troublemakers.’52
The same principles applied to the political realm.
Although Africans were not allowed to participate in white
political institutions, they were given complete control
over their local, tribal, and territorial affairs.

The

Applicant’s suggestion that these Native Reserves—or
Bantustans—were unfunded and overcrowded was placed next to
South Africa’s widely publicized Odendaal Report, which
promised to spend over £75 million on a five-year social
modernisation program in the territory.

It would probably

take ‘one-hundred years or more’ to get indigenous people
ready for full self-determination, but the Nationalist
government was willing to commit the necessary resources.53
Finally, in the area of education, South African
lawyers framed apartheid as an agent of development.

In

their minds, direct comparisons between white and nonwhite
education levels were deceptive because African ‘tribes’
were so widely opposed to universal European instruction
standards.

Education was a source of identity and power

for local groups.

Nationalist officials coupled this point

with evidence that, despite these barriers, the government
was able to increase school attendance among African
children by forty-six percent between 1950 and 1961; a
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number which compared favorably to Ethiopia’s five percent
and Liberia’s twenty-three percent.54

Returning to article

2 of the Mandate—which instructed the Mandatory to ‘promote
to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social
progress of the inhabitants of the territory’—South Africa
concluded that Gross’s entire case was baseless.

Despite

hollow assertions to the contrary, apartheid was
implemented in good faith in South West Africa, proving
that racial separation was not incompatible with the
project of development.55
To hammer this point home, South Africa made a bold
move as oral arguments commenced on 30 March 1965.
Standing before the Court for the first time since 1962, de
Villiers invited the judges to conduct an on-site
inspection of South West Africa.

The only condition was

that they also visit Ethiopia, Liberia, and a former
Mandate territory like Tanzania.

With this comparative

understanding of the ‘African reality,’ the Court would be
better equipped to ‘form a general impression of comparable
conditions and standards of the material and moral wellbeing and social progress of the inhabitants.’56

The

request was a shrewd tactical maneuver—designed to link
African problems with racial inferiority rather than
colonial injustice.

De Villiers understood that Gross was
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modeling his case on the Nuremberg Trials, and hoped the
invitation would highlight the flaw which undergirded the
historical analogy.

The Allied case against Nazi Germany’s

leadership-class worked because American lawyers could show
that German policies resulted in the wholesale violation of
human rights during World War II.

If the Nationalist

government could prove through concrete, comparative
evidence that its policies were not resulting in the ends
alleged by the Applicants, South Africa’s critics—or at
least the members of the International Court—would be
forced to reassess the basic charge against apartheid.

The

National Party’s racial policies certainly stood in
juxtaposition to trends toward self-determination in the
Third World.

But that did not necessarily mean apartheid

was ‘genocide masquerading under the guise of a civilized
dispensation of justice.’57
The gamble paid off.
by the South African move.

Gross’s legal team was surprised
Stridently refusing to accept

the proposal, the Applicants claimed that such a trip would
sap the Court’s resources and unnecessarily extend the
trial.

It was ‘unnecessary, expensive, dilatory,

cumbersome and unwarranted.’58
pointed out at the time,

59

However, as some observers

Gross’s declarations masked the

fact that de Villiers had placed the African bloc’s lawyers
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in a genuine catch-22.

Without tangible evidence of

oppression in South West Africa, the case against apartheid
lacked substance and depth.

But to obtain concrete

evidence of oppression, members of the African bloc would
have to open their own internal policies to scrutiny and
examination.

In essence, de Villiers was asking his

opponents to move their charges from the realm of rhetoric
into the world of reality.

If the Court went through with

the trip and supported South Africa’s argument, the
rationale of the Third World’s international political
program—in particular the argument that political
liberation formed the gateway to economic development—would
be discredited.

In de Villiers’ own words, the dilemma was

‘unenviable.’60
Gross responded by moving the case to purely
theoretical grounds.

Although he intended to

systematically challenge each point of South Africa’s
Counter-Memorial, he announced in early April that the
Republic’s entire brief had been ‘immaterial.’61

The issue

was no longer oppression in South West Africa, but the fact
that the South African government’s policies violated the
‘international human rights norm of non-discrimination or
non-separation.’62

According to Gross, this norm was

created by the United Nations Charter and the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights and solidified in the early
1960s with the General Assembly’s Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.63
Although it did not explicitly trump South Africa’s
national sovereignty, it gave ‘specific and objective’
meaning to international agreements like the Mandate and
bound international organizations such as the United
Nations to certain forms of behavior.64

The implications

were self-evident when applied to the South West Africa
case.

Article 2 could not be upheld without a parallel

commitment to non-discrimination and non-separation.

As

one legal expert explained at the time, ‘The sole issue
[now] was the existence of an international legal norm
which absolutely and categorically prohibited apartheid.
Neither South Africa’s motives in instituting apartheid in
South West Africa, nor the effects of that policy on the
territory’s inhabitants were now at issue.’65

In Gross’s

mind, the ball was back in South Africa’s court.
However, this line of reasoning dramatically changed
the rules of the game.

Gross was now modeling the African

bloc’s case not on the Nuremberg Trials, but on America’s
own Brown v. Board of Education.

Because ‘separation [was]

inherently unequal’ it followed that apartheid
automatically suppressed human rights in South West Africa,
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irrespective of the evidence presented by the Nationalist
government.66

Linking this situation directly to U.S.

domestic law, Gross argued, ‘The Respondent’s policy of
racial segregation in . . . the Territory is even more
affirmative, explicit and far-reaching than the racial bar
struck down by the Brown decision.’67

And if the United

States government—the most powerful political entity of the
postwar era—was willing to support the norm of nondiscrimination, it followed that the Court would have to
deliver a judgment against racial separation in South West
Africa.
Gross was getting to the same end—the incongruity of
apartheid and development—through different means.

During

the initial phase of the trial, the African bloc’s case
pivoted on the idea that apartheid was illegitimate because
it impeded the development of local South West Africans in
tangible and observable ways.

This argument did not

fundamentally change during the second phase of the trial,
but the emphasis shifted from local dynamics to
international structure.

In very natural ways, the raison

d'être of the African position came to the forefront.

The

case was as much about legitimizing postcolonial discourse
as it was about the intrinsic morality of events in South
West Africa; apartheid was significant not only because it
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oppressed black South Africans but because it held symbolic
importance at the international level.

Through its

theoretical sophistication and political intransigence,
apartheid challenged the very idea that history was moving
linearly toward a political order based on nonwhite
liberation, human rights, and economic development.

And

faith in this narrative, in many ways, was the source of
the Third World’s power in the first decade after
decolonisation.

By reframing the charge against the

Nationalist Party around the global norm of nondiscrimination, the Applicants sought not only to
invalidate the logic and rationale of South Africa’s
policies, but also to reify the authority and prestige of
the Third World’s political agenda.
This shift was a huge leap for the Court.

Beyond the

basic quandary of whether one sovereign’s domestic law had
universal, transnational value was an even greater
question: Was there a single moral system for the world?
Gross felt that if he could convince the Court that such a
system existed, he would obtain a favorable ruling on
apartheid in South West Africa.

Even more, a positive

judgment on these terms would institutionalise a new
balance between traditional ‘European’ notions of global
order—based on the restrictive concept of national
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sovereignty—and an emerging ‘postcolonial’ vision of power
based on universal human rights.
argument were extraordinary.

The implications of the

But, as de Villiers had

envisioned, the Applicant case now rested on tenuous,
uncharted ground.

Did the ‘international community’ truly

have boundless supervisory powers over nation-states in the
world-system?

HISTORICAL INEVITABILITIES
This contest did not unfold in a vacuum.

Put plainly,

litigation at International Court mattered because
Washington was listening.

Having created the basic

scaffolding of the postwar international system, the United
States gave life to notions of transnational law and
enforced the Court’s authority at the United Nations
Security Council.

U.S. leaders may not have been

emotionally vested in the issues discussed at The Hague,
but American attitudes nonetheless shaped the lines around
what was politically possible in the outside world.68
U.S. policy toward apartheid was conflicted in the
1960s.

On the one hand, the State Department tended to

treat the National Party as a political and propaganda
liability.

With the creation of the African Bureau in the

late 1950s, liberals such as G. Mennen Williams and Arthur

- 39 -

Goldberg obtained an institutional platform to push the
United States toward confrontation with the Republic.

Like

Third World nationalists and South African officials, they
often couched their goals in the language of development,
subtly equating Africa’s aspirations with America’s own
commitment to ‘democratic principles, interracial society
and human welfare.’

These individuals did not see the same

linkages as African leaders like Kaunda, but they generally
accepted a progressive vision of history and social
justice.69

Apartheid was significant, in this regard,

because it distracted Third World leaders from the benefits
of Great Society liberalism and pushed the region into an
unnecessarily combative anti-Western stance.70

Robert

Komer, the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, framed these fears well in
November 1965, saying that if America failed to back the
anti-apartheid movement it would be viewed as opposing the
‘historically inevitable’ rise of African majority rule.71
Few members of the State Department equated support for
African nationalism with an armed intervention against
South Africa, but many felt sanctions against the National
Party would eventually become unavoidable.72
In contradistinction, the Pentagon, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency tended to frame the
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Nationalist government as America’s main ally in Africa.
Placing precedence on concrete U.S. interests in the
region—namely a NASA tracking station and over $600 million
worth of private investment—they consistently castigated
the ‘radicalism’ percolating through the State Department.
Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
put it best, ‘As long as communist penetration and racial
discord in Africa remain an active threat to Free World
interests, stability in South Africa is desirable and the
United States should do everything that its political and
moral position permits to contribute to this.’73

Self-rule

in the Third World might have been historically inevitable,
but that did not negate U.S. national security interests or
lessen the dangers of the Cold War.
In the mid-1960s, President Johnson generally sided
with the State Department.

‘I feel that the prime

determinant of U.S. influence in Africa will be the stance
the U.S. takes on those political issues of primary concern
to the Africans themselves,’ he explained in a private memo
to Secretary of State Dean Rusk in November 1965.

‘U.S.

concern for African problems must be demonstrated by
actions, and in terms, which will have an immediate appeal
to the people of Africa.’74

The result was a foreign policy

that tilted toward confrontation with South Africa.
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Although a workable solution was admittedly ‘difficult to
identify,’ the U.S. national policy review on the Republic—
deemed ‘comprehensive’ and ‘authoritative’ by the Johnson
administration—nonetheless opened with the declaration that
the ‘status quo’ needed to be overturned in the region.
The authors presented a conceptual map that mirrored the
African bloc’s own understanding of the situation.

While

the rest of the world was ‘moving fast in one direction,’
the South African government was ‘moving fast in the
opposite direction.’

And with the United States’ own

racial situation ‘in an acute stage of resolution,’ a tepid
approach toward apartheid was no longer acceptable.75
However, opposition to South Africa did not
automatically mean support for the African bloc at the
United Nations.

As historian Tim Borstelmann and others

highlight, Johnson viewed himself first and foremost as a
‘moderate man of the political center.’76

His decision to

confront South Africa was driven not by genuine moral
concerns with apartheid, but by an overriding desire to coopt the energies of black and white extremism at home and
abroad.

The question was one of control.

Like any power

structure, the liberal international order constructed by
U.S. leaders in the late 1940s functioned because memberstates around the world tacitly invested in its authority.
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Apartheid challenged this balance in two interlocking ways.
Most obviously, it distracted attention from America’s own
goals and obfuscated the moral primacy of liberal
internationalism.

On a deeper level, however, South

Africa’s refusal to adjust its policies in the face of
General Assembly criticism—and the Security Council’s
reluctance to punish the apartheid government for its
obstinacy—eroded faith that the U.N. could be an agent of
social justice.

When taken together, these trends spelled

trouble for the United States.

In the minds of many

liberals, the intellectual infrastructure of American
hegemony was buckling under the weight of postcolonial
politics.

A new ‘status quo’ in South Africa would not

only counteract these trends, but it would also help the
United States reconsolidate its political authority in the
decolonized world.
The case at the International Court focused these
abstract concerns in concrete ways.

As the State

Department explained, the trial was ‘the first major
confrontation between the world community and South Africa’
and a major challenge to the ‘authority of the U.N.’77

The

Johnson administration’s overriding goal was to avoid the
African bloc’s ‘all-or-nothing’ checkmate and prevent an
angry explosion at the U.N. General Assembly.78
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Assuming

that the ICJ judgment would go against South Africa on all
counts, officials tried to preempt the consequences by
mollifying the Nationalist government’s policies in South
West Africa.
initiative.

They adopted an aggressive tactical
Not only was the arms embargo of 1963

continued, but the State Department began removing NASA and
DOD facilities from South Africa and asked lending agencies
to suspend economic activity with the Republic.79

On an

informal level, Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen
Williams and the African Bureau further coordinated a
series of meetings with prominent businessmen to discourage
investment in the Republic.80

Even the Pentagon got

involved, canceling the U.S.S. Independence’s port call to
Cape Town in May 1965.81

These efforts were coupled with a

series of planning papers that explored the feasibility and
desirability of economic sanctions and/or military action
in southern Africa.82

By the end of the year, the United

States—working in conjunction with Great Britain—was in the
midst of a full-scale diplomatic battle with the Republic
over the implementation of the Odendaal Report.83

This

culminated with a pair of Aide-Mémoires in 1965 and 1966
suggesting, with calculated subtlety, that the West would
support economic sanctions if South African officials
failed to comply with the ICJ decision.84
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This turn of events surprised Pretoria.

Writing from

Washington in 1965, ambassador Taswell speculated that the
U.S. public was being ‘softened up’ for an attack on the
Republic.

South Africa’s ‘most dangerous enemies’ were

those out ‘to win the Negro vote in the United States and
win the goodwill of the black man in Africa and the AfroAsian group as a whole.’

For these individuals, the ‘white

man in Africa’ was merely an ‘expendable obstacle.’85
Others pushed against such ‘over-simplified’ sentiments.
‘The majority of the United States policy-making elements
[are] not yet aware enough of the South African situation
to have fixed views for or against,’ lectured Donald Sole,
the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

‘In simple terms,

we are not ‘Communists’ nor are we ‘Fascist’ enough (vide
Franco) to be classified as ‘enemy.’’

There was still time

to improve U.S.-South Africa relations.86

M.I. Botha, South

Africa’s U.N. representative in the mid-1960s, agreed with
this sentiment, but still felt the United States was guilty
of ideological hubris.

The Americans, in his mind, were

incapable of distinguishing ‘between the racial situation
in the United States and that in South Africa.

To them

nationhood is somehow only nationhood in the image of the
United States which is an all-embracing nation—as Whitman
called it, ‘a nation of nations.’’87
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This intellectual egotism did not bode well for the
Republic.

Nationalist officials were angered primarily by

the United States’ unwillingness to acknowledge that the
trial itself was tipping definitively in South Africa’s
favor.

De Villiers spent much of 1965 burying the Court

under documentary evidence and highlighting the
implications and contradictions of Gross’s norm of ‘nondiscrimination’ and ‘non-separation.’

Turning the concept

on the Republic’s enemies, he argued first that the
internal policies of India, Liberia, Ethiopia, and dozens
of other states in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America
fully supported ethnic, economic, religious, and racial
stratification.

Although the ideal of ‘non-discrimination’

was rhetorically ubiquitous at the United Nations General
Assembly, the concept still did not exist concretely
anywhere in the world.88

Furthermore, if the Court accepted

the logic of the Applicant’s accusation, it would open the
door for infinite, unrestrained, and politically-charged
litigation at the International Court.

Would

‘untouchables’ in India be able to attack their government
for its legacy of discrimination?

Were African Americans

entitled to prosecute the United States for housing and
employment segregation?

De Villiers did not provide

answers to these questions, but his message was clear:
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Human rights were not static, self-evident, or onedimensional.

They were fluid and subjective conceptual

instruments used by actors with particular political
agendas.
The second part of de Villier’s counterattack tried to
highlight the ‘true’ origins of Gross’s legal strategy.
Drawing selectively on expert knowledge from Europe, South
Africa, and the United States, South Africa’s lawyer
presented a litany of witnesses to lament the
‘indiscriminant use of racial discrimination, segregation,
separation, apartheid, [and] Nazism’ at the General
Assembly, and bemoan apartheid’s false association with
racial superiority, doctrines of expansionism, and racial
hatred.

Politics rather than ‘law and history’ were

driving these linkages.89

Once de Villiers established this

point, he turned his attention again to South Africa’s own
policies.

Adeptly wrapping his country’s social program

in the language of social science, he contrasted the
African bloc’s ‘fairytale’ history of global unity with the
Republic’s ‘judicious’ story of global diversity and
separate development.90
For de Villiers and his associates, the case climaxed
in mid-October with the testimony of Dr. Stefan Possony, a
professor of sociology from the Hoover Institution at
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Stanford University.

In an exchange South African

propagandists’ highlighted often after the judgment, the
professor suggested that even if Gross’s norm existed, it
could only be applied to inter-state relations, not the
domestic policies of individual nations.91

Dr. Possony

concluded by rejecting the philosophical underpinnings of
the Applicant’s case:
Mankind with all its diversities has never
accepted a single writ.

To impose a single

formula would be ideological imperialism.

Given

the ideals of humanity—the hopes of advance as
well as the promises of human rights—but given
also a manifold reality, the best principle, it
seems to me, is to tailor methods or responses to
specific challenges. . . . As Hegel taught,
reality is always reasonable in its own way.
Reality can be changed, and of course it should
be improved.

But continuity and respect for the

historical tradition remain as the unavoidable
framework of human betterment.92
When South African politicians tried making this point
directly to U.S. policymakers in the months before the
Court’s verdict, they were met by indifference and
hostility.

In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State

- 48 -

G. Mennen Williams, ambassador Taswell was told that the
‘sincerity’ of apartheid did not matter.

The Republic was

‘sitting on a time-bomb and heading for a racial
collision.’93

Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed

similar sentiments in late 1965 in a discussion with South
Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller.
According to the American diplomat, everything turned on
the fact that apartheid was alienating member-states at the
United Nations.

‘There may be differences between

nations,’ he explained, ‘but the abandonment of the
elementary structure would put civilization back about 500
years—there would simply be no other channel of
communication on the approach to differences.’

In

referencing the ICJ decision, Rusk dismissed Muller’s
contention that South Africa would win the case, and
referred suggestively to a conversation he had had with a
Russian official several years earlier.

‘The law is like

the tongue of a wagon,’ the Secretary of State explained.
‘It goes in the direction in which it is pointed.’94
This mindset was internalised in Washington by mid1966.

In a National Security Council meeting on the eve of

the Court’s decision, Undersecretary of State George Ball
opened the conversation by speculating that the judges
would rule against South Africa on all counts.
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Although an

armed U.N. intervention was still unfathomable, the United
States could not give ‘the black Africans the idea we are
laying down, nor can we permit a breakdown of the
International Court and the international legal system.’
Debate erupted almost immediately on the utility of
sanctions, with CIA Director Richard Helms and Treasury
Secretary Henry Fowler suggesting that South Africa was
‘one of the least vulnerable countries in the world’ to
such action.
definitive.

President Johnson, however, was less
He called for the establishment of a task

force—ostensibly under the guidance of Arthur Goldberg—to
plot a course to ‘relieve some of the pressure’ of the
Court’s decision.

In typically colloquial terms, the

President explained that ‘even a blind hog [could] find an
acorn.’95
Few observers were distracted by such euphemisms.
Watching the situation from Europe, British officials
summarized, ‘It is almost inconceivable that the Americans
would be prepared to cast their first veto in favour of the
White man in Southern Africa, let alone veto an attempt to
uphold the rule of law which had been flouted by the White
minority.’96

If the Applicants successfully obtained a

rationale for sanctions under article 94 of the U.N.
Charter, in other words, the United States would be
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obliged—in some ways even forced—to support action against
South Africa.

Just as Gross had envisioned, the United

States would be in a political checkmate.
There was only one catch—the Court’s final judgment.
After seven months of deliberations and five years of
litigation, this ruling came finally on 18 July 1966.

With

the world watching in anticipation, the ICJ unveiled a
startling eight-to-seven decision.97

According to the

Court’s new majority, the Applicants no longer had
sufficient ‘legal right or interest’ in the South West
Africa Mandate to obtain a judgment on the merits of their
case.

‘Humanitarian considerations can constitute the

inspirational basis for rules of law,’ the Court explained,
but unless given ‘jurisdictional expression’ and ‘clothed
in legal form,’ it was impossible for them to ‘generate
legal rights and obligations.’98

The African bloc’s

arguments, in this regard, were ‘based on considerations of
an extra-legal character, the product of after-knowledge’
more suited for the political realm than the legal system.99
It was not the job of the Court to ‘fill in the gaps’ of
international law.100

This decision not only reversed the

logic, content, and implications of the Court’s 1962
ruling; it shattered the idea that the Court would act as
an agent of transitional justice and teleological history.
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The ruling stunned African nationalist leaders.

In

the days that followed countries around the continent
reacted with visceral anger.

Ghana’s U.N. ambassador

summarized the mindset in late July, saying that the Court
was so ‘out of tune with the tempo of [the] modern world’
that African countries would never again acknowledge its
‘jurisdiction’ or ‘authority.’101

In testimony before U.S.

Congress in August, Gross lamented that the decision had
‘introduced a new element of uncertainty into international
adjudication at a time when predictable and systematic
legal order needs to be established.’

So long as the

judges were ‘pro-Western and [bound] to international law
which is essentially European,’ Third World countries would
resist and question the power of the Court.102

In commentary

that foreshadowed the events of the early 1970s, the New
York Times said, ‘The decision on South-West Africa may
appear to [African states] to confirm the growing suspicion
that if Black Africa is to get help against South Africa .
. . it must look to the Communist bloc.’103
In Pretoria, officials looked at the judgment with
measured ebullience.

In a formal statement to the

international community, Prime Minister Verwoerd declared
sanctimoniously that the Republic would ‘not crow over
[its] opponents,’ even though ‘impartial observers’ had
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determined their claims of oppression to be ‘unfounded.’
The ‘door of friendship’ would be left open, but he warned
that ‘intervention in each others affairs’ would benefit no
one and lectured that ‘world peace’ would come only through
economic development, not ‘jealousy, interference and
conflict.’104

A secret briefing paper further elaborated on

these points in early August. ‘It has always been clear
that the main purpose of the promoters of the South West
Africa case was to obtain a Judgment in contentious
proceedings, which if not complied with, could lead to an
invocation of Article 94 of the Charter,’ the authors
explained. ‘Our adversaries have consequently not succeeded
in obtaining a basis for invoking Article 94 of the
Charter.

This is probably the most significant effect of

the Judgment.’

Although the political game between the

African bloc and South Africa would continue at the General
Assembly, the possibility of legal recourse was
‘definitively shut-down.’

The situation had returned to

‘pre-1960 conditions.’105

CONCLUSIONS
Scholars of international law have debated the wisdom
of Gross’s legal strategy for over four decades.
been kind.106

Few have

However, much of the criticism glosses over
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the historical exigencies facing the New York lawyer and
his compatriots in the mid-1960s.

The establishment of a

human rights regime after World War II created a unique
space for the initiatives of Third World actors in the
years surrounding decolonisation.

Framed in universalistic

terms, the discourse of human rights rationalized the
demands of the global south and created a world where
European colonialism was no longer conceptually
sustainable.

The ICJ case was both a microcosm of this

process and a turning point in its history.

It was the

moment when the marriage between human rights, development,
and political freedom was put to the test in a court of
international law.

Gross’s case may have marked a radical

shift in legal theory, but his approach was tied intimately
to a much broader movement unfolding in the years before
and after decolonisation.
In the wake of the Court’s decision, this story
changed in dramatic ways.

Anti-apartheid activism at the

United Nations grew more ubiquitous but less influential in
the late 1960s.

Having failed to secure a victory in the

legal realm, African nationalists refocused their energies
on the political arena, rallying behind a series of U.N.
General Assembly resolutions that superficially terminated
the Mandate and renamed the territory Namibia.
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The

Security Council—particularly Great Britain and the United
States—refused to take action.

Faced with this impasse

(again), African nationalism crumbled in the late 1960s,
both as a political movement and as an international
discourse.

Although anti-apartheid activism continued to

mobilise an array of liberals, civil rights activists, and
church leaders in the years to come, the clarity that
marked the struggle in the years surrounding decolonisation
fractured.

As these trends became more obvious, liberation

groups like the African National Congress (ANC) and the
South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) turned away
from their ineffectual patrons at the Organization of
African Unity and moved slowly into the communist sphere of
influence.

By the time the Portuguese colonies finally

collapsed in the mid-1970s, southern Africa was no longer
the symbolic epicenter of the decolonisation struggle but
merely one more battleground in the larger Cold War between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
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